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Abstract 
This paper explores the pattern of technical change in the Korean economy from 1970 to 
2013 and investigates its determinants. We use the Classical growth-distribution schedule 
to show that the labor-saving and capital-using pattern has predominated. For the rationale 
behind this Marx-biased technical change (“MBTC”), we focus on the relationship 
between technical change and real wage growth via the evolution of labor and capital 
productivity, and verify the historical direction of technical change against the rise and fall 
of the working class. Furthermore, we find that the deviation during the post-crisis period 
from the long-run trend of MBTC is not attributable to the vitality of new technological 
innovations, but rather the reflection of class dynamics over extracting productivity under 
weaker capital deepening. The results suggest that the recent deterioration of labor share 
and labor unions in Korea is closely associated with low incentive for technological 
progress, which contributes to prolonged stagnation. 
Keywords: growth-distribution schedule, Marx-biased technical change, labor 
productivity, capital productivity 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Korea had been one of the fastest growing countries in the post-war period. It recorded a 
real growth rate of 8.5%, 9.3% and 8.4% during the 1970s, 1980s and mid-1990s, 
respectively, which earned Korea the title of the “East Asian miracle economy”. Although 
its dazzling state-led development model declined sharply with the 1997-1998 Asian crisis 
and the subsequent sweeping neoliberal reforms led to the secular bear phase during the 
21st century with a 3.6% growth rate, Korea remains a role model for catching up and even 
of quickly recovering from the crisis. Given that technical progress is an inherent feature of 
economic growth, unsurprisingly, Korea’s remarkable technical innovation as a driver of 
its rapid growth has been in the spotlight for decades.  
However, while Korea’s technical progress is allegedly attributed to human capital 
accumulation fostered by education and trade openness (Lucas 1993) or the strong 
industrial policies that allocate rents to private entities, which have enabled chaebols to 
defy comparative advantage (Lee et al. 2005), the dynamics of technical change associated 
with the contradictions of capital accumulation have attracted little interest. That is, by 
belittling the bloody Taylorism, harsh labor repression, the chaebol's overgrown social 
power, and U.S.-Japan auspices, all of which structured the institutional architecture 
supporting the capitalist operation in Korea (Hart-Landsberg et al. 2007), the above 
conventional interpretations have treated technical progress as practically neutral with 
respect to income distribution and as exogenous to class conflict.  
The mainstream economic growth literature freely relied on the elusive concept of total 
factor productivity (hereafter “TFP”) for understanding technical change (Easterly & 
Levine 2001). Even when addressing theoretically relatively uncontentious labor 
productivity growth, the literature generally and unavoidably invoked TFP change as its 
contributing factor. However, despite much effort to estimate the size of TFP in  
growth accounting, its unreliable assumptions of production functions have baffled the 
proper investigation of technical changes (Felipe & McCombie 2013). In Korea’s case, 
we still run up against mixed TFP calculations which even contradict one another.1 
                                          
1 Recent empirical results such as OECD (2015) and Chun et al. (2015) find that Korea’s TFP growth 
 
 
Moreover, within the common framework of calculating TFP, which is nothing more 
than the residual of growth accounting formulas, we are given few explanations as to 
where technical progress has originated from and why it has favored capitalists rather 
than the working class or both. 
Instead, we considered how technical progress emerges from within the economic system 
following in the steps of Classical economists such as Ricardo and Marx, who emphasized 
the struggle between classes as a motive for technical change (Kurz, 2010). In that vein, 
we explored endogenous patterns of technical change in the Korean economy for the 
period 1970 to 2013, the most recent time span of data available. We aimed to find whether 
technical change has a biased direction and investigated the specific bias determinants, 
both of which have seldom been discussed in textbook economics. 
The induced innovation literature includes neoclassical research such as Kennedy (1964) 
and Drandrakis & Phelps (1966), who modelled the theoretical logic according to which 
capitalist firms adopt technologies using a specific production factor more intensively in 
response to a decrease in its relative cost.2 Meanwhile, without depending on production 
function or its unrealistic and tautological assumptions, Duménil & Lévy (1995) and Foley 
& Michl (1999) stressed the inevitability of the biased technical change, which promises to 
increase the profit rate at the existing wage so that only ‘viable techniques’ are embraced.3 
Accordingly, a growing body of analysis, like that of Foley & Marquetti (1999), Marquetti 
(2003), Ferretti (2008), Felipe et al. (2008), and Vaona (2011), have attempted to 
empirically demonstrate the bias in the real economy. They show, albeit with some 
variations in the individual countries and time spans, that the predominant form of 
technical change in recent decades has been labor-saving and capital-using. Additionally, 
in explaining why the Industrial Revolution was British in origin, Allen (2011) proves that 
the very high wages in 18th-century Britain not only induced British firms to invent 
technologies that substituted capital for labor but also generated the firms’ demand for 
literacy, numeracy, and trade skills that were necessary for the technological revolution to 
unfold. 
                                                                                                                         
rate and its contribution to economic growth have long been fairly high even before the Asian crisis, 
while the more widespread recognition is that that the quantitative increase of factor inputs, rather 
than qualitative TFP, drove Korea’s rapid growth (Young 1995; Krugman 1994). 
2 More recently, Acemoglu (2010) emphasizes the way in which the relative abundance of the 
production factor, including different types of labor, determines the direction of technical change. 
3  Basu (2000) and Hölzl (2010) address the subtle but significant differences between the 
Neoclassical- and Classical-induced innovation approaches. 
 
 
We followed the above studies and employed Foley & Michl’s (1999) growth-distribution 
schedule. By adding econometrical analyses within a historical context, we revealed the 
endogenous feature of the bias in technical change. In particular, we cautioned that the 
above-referenced empirical literature measures and discusses technical progress in terms of 
labor productivity growth and thus explicitly omits capital productivity or implicitly 
assumes constant capital productivity. This practically fails to distinguish a form of Marx-
biased capital-using technical change and labor-augmenting or neutral technical change. As 
Groll & Orzech (1990: 99) properly points out: “whereas the former imposes changes that 
are advantageous to the owners of the means of production, the latter, by definition, 
preserves the distribution of the total product between labor and capital unchanged.” Hence, 
we drew a distinct line between biased and neutral technical change by looking at separate 
trends in labor and capital productivity and identified the factors driving the biases in both 
productivities, which will help evaluate the relevance of Marx-dynamics in technical 
change in Korea and clarify its implications for the current lengthy recession. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief framework 
of the growth-distribution schedule and characterizes the different patterns of technical 
change. The third section provides the schedule in Korea and its interpretations. Sections 4 
and 5 explore the bias-inducing factors and specifically discuss the deviation of capital 
productivity from the long-run trend during the post-crisis period. Section 6 summarizes 
the findings and concludes with a policy implications discussion. 
 
2. Analytical Framework: Growth-Distribution Schedule  
Following the pioneering work of Foley & Michl (1999), we consider a simple capitalist 
economy using only capital and labor. The production technique and its direction of 
change are represented in the growth-distribution schedule (hereafter “GDS”). For a given 
year, X is real gross output, K is net stock of non-residential fixed assets, C is aggregate 
consumption, I is gross investment, D is depreciation, N is the number of workers 
employed, W is total worker compensation, and R is net profit. Using both national income 
accounting identity, X ≡ W + R + D, and expenditure identity, X ≡ C + I, the following 
GDS is easily derived:, 
c ൌ x െ ሺg ൅ dሻk   (1)  
where x=X/N is labor productivity, w=W/N is the wage rate, c=C/N is social 
consumption per worker, k=K/N is capital per worker, d=D/K is the depreciation rate, and 
 
 
g+d=I/K is the rate of capital accumulation. Considering the identity, x ≡ w + vk where v is 
the gross rate of profit, we can rearrange equation (1) into (2), where ρ = x/k is the output 
per unit of capital or capital productivity. 
w ൌ xሺ1 െ ሺv/ρሻሻ          (2) 
In the (c, g+d) space, the schedule of (1) is a straight line with the vertical and horizontal 
intercepts of (x, ρ), respectively. Additionally, in the (w, v) space, the schedule of (2) is the 
same straight line with the same intercepts. The schedules imply an inverse relationship 
between the real wages and the profit rate as well as the consumption and capital 
accumulation. As both schedules are mathematically identical and have an equal –k slope, 
we can depict them graphically in the same quadrant as in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1. Growth-distribution schedule, Marx-biased technical change. 
 
The GDS movements reflect the bias in the adoption of technical change, which a 
combination of changes in labor and capital productivity presents. When labor 
productivity(x) increases, the vertical intercept shifts outward, and when capital 
productivity(ρ) increases, the horizontal intercept shifts outward. Accordingly, we are able 
to identify some common technical change patterns in the relevant literature as follows, 
and any pattern below can be depicted in the GDS.  
For example, a pure labor-saving (Harrod-neutral) technical change that increases x while 
keeping ρ constant corresponds to a clockwise rotation of the GDS around its horizontal 
axis. Inversely, a pure capital-saving (Solow-neutral) technical change that increases ρ 
while keeping x constant corresponds to a counter-clockwise rotation of the GDS around 
its vertical axis. The other GDS shifts are relevant; a nearly equal labor- and capital-saving 
(Hicks-neutral) technical change that increases ρ and x alike corresponds to a near-parallel 
outward shift of the GDS, while a labor-saving and capital-using (Marx-biased) technical 
 
 
change that increases ρ and decreases x corresponds to a clockwise pivot around the 
switching point in the positive GDS orthant. This final movement is illustrated from (x, ρ) 
to (x’, ρ’) in Figure 1. 
As the GDS assumes a one-commodity production economy and is not free from the 
issues the Cambridge controversy raised, the GDS has a chance to be non-linear in the 
actual economies. Foley & Marquetti (2003) and Basu (2010) observe that this point poses 
a potential caveat to the GDS framework. We have yet to devise an alternative model that 
can address, for example, the problems due to capital aggregation in a non-linear GDS. 
However, from a pragmatic perspective, as Ochoa (1984) showed for the U.S., da Silva 
(1991) for Brazil, and Tsoulfidis & Rieu (2006) for Korea, all estimated GDSs are quasi-
linear and display few curvatures, which justifies our simple analytic framework. 
 
3. Historical Directions in Technical Change 
In this section, we investigate the direction of bias in technical change for the Korean 
economy. We used the National Income at factor cost as a measure of output (X). For the 
real net capital stock (K), we employed the national balance sheet accounts the Bank of 
Korea construct using the perpetual inventory method. The capital stock excludes both 
inventories and non-produced assets such as land, mineral, and energy reserves. Based on 
the data Statistics Korea and the Ministry of Employment and Labor collected, we 
calculated the total number of hours worked for labor productivity denominator (L).  
The analysis is divided into three phases: 1970-1987, 1988-1997, and 1998-2013. Both 
the first and second phases were periods of rapid export-led industrialization and 
successful catching-up, while the second period was marked by the explosive growth of 
labor movements as well as large conglomerates that compete in global high-technology 
industries. The third phase is a post-Asian crisis period characterized by the thoroughgoing 
liberalization of financial markets and labor market deregulation. Figure 2 presents the 
movement of the GDS over all three phases and the above principal moments. 
Fig. 2. Growth-distribution schedule of Korea: all industries 
 
 
(a) Total period                            (b) Principal moments  
The clockwise pivot of GDS in Figure 2 shows that the Marx-biased pattern of technical 
change has been dominant for the entire period in Korea. Labor productivity has risen 
steadily with only a few exceptions when the economic crises occurred. The average labor 
productivity growth for all industries reached 4.85%. Conversely, capital productivity 
declined over all periods with an average growth rate of –2.79%. This long-run MBTC 
trend also occurred with manufacturing.  
This pictured MBTC touches upon an important issue on the ascending evolution of labor 
productivity, which is at odds with the overall decrease of capital productivity. As Duménil 
& Lévy (1995) who explain technical change in probabilistic terms noted, Korea’s case 
again confirms that technical innovation which increases both labor and capital 
productivity, contrary to Neoclassical claims, is intrinsically difficult to achieve. Thus, 
economic growth under capitalism likely strays from a balanced growth path. Besides, 
when constant labor share accompanies this “trajectory à la Marx” (Duménil & Lévy 
2003), the profit rate falls. That is to say, the trajectory of the Korean economy with 
technical progress has been endogenously crisis-prone and inevitably has entailed class 
conflict to offset the tendency toward a crisis. This Marxian point is a sine qua non, which 
mainstream textbooks praising Korea’s growth performance scarcely address.  
As Marquetti (2003) found, a strong MBTC tendency characterizes the evolution of less- 
developed economies that adopted capital-intensive technology from highly developed 
economies. In other words, capital-intensive investments usually accompany developing 
countries’ catching up process. With an average capital accumulation rate of over 12% 
during the high-growth regime in the first and second phase, the case of Korea with MBTC 
is the byword for dynamic but contradictory capitalist development. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Average growth rates (%) of labor and capital productivity 
Phases 
All-Industry  Manufacturing 
x  ρ  x  ρ  
1970-1987 5.16 -4.21 5.75 -2.70 
1988-1997 5.93 -3.68 9.47 -3.34 
1998-2013 3.85 -0.58 7.39 1.79 
Total (1970-2013) 4.85 -2.79 7.18 -1.24 
As a side note, during the post-1998 period when the financial crisis severely hit Korea 
and forced it to implement IMF-imposed structural adjustment programs, the increasing 
speed of labor productivity began to decelerate while the decreasing trend of capital 
productivity slackened or grew positively over intermittent years, as shown in Table 1. 
That is, although the pervasive long-term pattern of technical change has been labor-saving 
and capital-using, its evolutionary path was uneven, depending on the short phases of 
capitalist development. Overall, Korea in the 21st century, with lower economic growth 
and overly stagnant accumulation rates, has more frequently witnessed aspects of technical 
progress differing from the existing trend. This new phenomenon is more pronounced in 
the manufacturing sector, where productivity measurement is less controversial than 
compared with the entire economy, including the service sector. 
Will this new path in the 21st century, with increased Harrod- and Hicks-neutral technical 
change characteristics, be only a temporary deviation or a complete disengagement from 
the long-run trend of the Marx-biased pattern? To answer this puzzling phenomenon, we 
attempted to identify the factors that underpinned and determined the GDS pivot 
movement. 
 
4. Relationship between Technical Change and Real Wage 
Conventional wisdom has it that the combination of low wages and cheap exports drove 
the Korean economy’s high growth during the pre-1998 period. Taking into account a cruel 
military dictatorship with repressive labor laws and flagrant interventions into labor 
disputes, such opinions carried weight. However, the invincible developmental state was 
involved in the labor market not only as a conflict suppressor but also as a promoter of 
skill formation and learning (You & Chang, 1993; Ra & Shim, 2009). For the chaebols 
who started consolidating their power in the world market, cooperation with the 
interventionist state was vital for gaining de facto state-underwritten credit and tax 
incentives, and for expanding their business to more capital-intensive industries. Hence, 
 
 
keeping the wage increase in check was neither a priority nor advantageous for upgrading 
technologies (Seguino, 2000). In that vein, to maintain high accumulation levels, sustained 
and “guided” wage increases rather than low wages were more important. 
Indeed, as the time series of real wages and labor productivity in Figure 3 describes, both 
trends displayed almost consistent positive growth. For the real wage, the total 
compensation per hour worked by an employee deflated by the consumer price index was 
used to provide a measure of the workers’ real purchasing power. Although initially very 
low, real wages often grew more rapidly than labor productivity for the first two phases. In 
particular, when democratization movements finally ended the oppressive military regime, 
real wage growth was spurred and peaked in the early 1990s; hence, the labor share of the 
value added also surged, although for a relatively short period. 
Fig. 3. Time series of labor productivity and real wages 
(a) All-Industry                        (b) Manufacturing 
Note: LRW log-transformed real wage rate; LLP log-transformed labor productivity.  
Source: Statistics Korea (www.kosis.kr), Ministry of Employment and Labor (laborstat.molab.go.kr). 
Instead, labor productivity reactively increased enough to offset the shrinking profit from 
the wage increase. It is noteworthy that the rise in labor productivity was accompanied by 
the acceleration of fixed capital formation until the advent of the crisis in 1997-1998. 
Against the rapid rise of working class power, big conglomerates began to enlarge their 
vertical subcontracting and supplier networks with small and medium-sized firms, hence 
solidifying their monopoly power in technical innovation investment. Under the gradual 
change of the state-chaebol power dynamic toward the latter and freer overseas financing 
due to deregulation, these measures generated a mirage with another labor productivity 
boom that lasted until the mid-1990s, also acting as a carrot to appease the working class. 
After all, the case of Korea before the Asian crisis was an unusual example among 
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developing countries, which successfully intensified both the absolute and relative surplus 
value extraction in Marxian parlance. 
However, with the late-1990s currency crisis, labor market liberalization began to be 
forced, which included the labor protection law relaxation, mass dismissal law introduction, 
and employment flexibility enhancement. Due to these neoliberal measures, real wage 
growth decelerated considerably while the productivity series showed a slightly smoother 
growth, which implies the deterioration of labor income shares in the functional income 
distribution. Actually, the labor share dropped by almost 10 percentage points during the 
post-crisis period (see Figure 4).4 This reversal was more pronounced in manufacturing, 
which suffered from a mass employment reduction and became more vulnerable to price 
competition from rivals abroad compared to the non-tradeable service sector.  
Fig. 4. Labor income share (self-employment income adjusted); all industries, %  
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Note: Income data for adjustment is available only from 1975. 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
Based on the brief historical observations above, we econometrically examined the long-
run relationship between real wages and labor productivity. As a relevant strategy, we 
applied cointegration and the Granger-causality test based on the vector error-correction 
                                          
4 It is well known that labor income share more commonly used in official statistics underestimates 
the share of employee compensation in value added, because it calculates all income of the self-
employed as capital share. However, income of the self-employed comprises both labor and capital 
income, and there is a significant difference between the usual labor share and self-employment-
income-adjusted labor share (Gollin 2002). In particular, Korea has a 28.2% proportion of self-
employed to fully employed, which is far higher than the U.S (6.8%), Japan (11.8%), and the 
average of OECD members (15.8%) as of 2012 (OECD, 2014). Therefore, we recalculated the 
labor share by omitting the operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises (OSPUE) from 
the denominator (Y), which is algebraically the same as assuming the proportion of labor and 
capital income of OSPUE is equal to that of the rest of the economy.  
 
 
model (VECM) for Korea, like Marquetti (2004) did for the U.S. and de Souza (2015) did 
for a panel of countries. Because unit root tests clearly show that both series are 
nonstationary and integrated of order one (see Appendix), we first ascertained the presence 
of a long-run equilibrium between the two time series by using the methodology Johansen 
(1991) developed. The results clearly indicated a single co-integrating vector, which 
implies some comovement between the two series in the long run (see Appendix). Then, 
we estimated the VECM as equation (3) and (4),  
ΔLP௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ∑ ߚଵ௜ΔLP௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߚଶ௜ΔRW௧ି௜ ൅௣௜ୀଵ௣௜ୀଵ ߛଵ߳	ෝ௧ିଵ	 ൅ ݑଵ௧       (3) 
ΔRW௧ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ∑ ߠଵ௜ΔRW௧ି௜ ൅ ∑ ߠଶ௜ΔLP௧ି௜ ൅௣௜ୀଵ௣௜ୀଵ ߛଶ߳	ෝ௧ିଵ ൅ ݑଶ௧      (4) 
where LP and RW denote labor productivity and real wages, ϵ	is an error correction term 
in a normalized form, and u is a random error term. Given that we have only 44 annual 
observations, a maximum lag length of four is imposed on the equations and the lag length 
is chosen based on the Akaike and Schwartz criterion. The optimal lags were mostly one or 
two, hence we reported both cases for a robustness check. Inasmuch as the existence of 
cointegration implies the Granger causality but does not indicate the direction of causality, 
we further examined both the short-run and long-run Granger causality within the VECM. 
The causality was obtained by testing the long-run (error correction term) and short-run 
(differenced explanatory variables) effects together with the joint F-statistic (Gujarati 2011: 
272-274; Lütkepohl 2005: 262). 5  That is, for equation (3), if the null hypothesis 
ܪ଴:	ߚଶଵ ൌ ߚଶଶ ൌ ⋯ ൌ ߚଶ௝ ൌ 0	ܽ݊݀	ߛଵ ൌ 0 is rejected, the real wages do Granger-cause 
labor productivity. The symmetrical hypothesis, whether labor productivity Granger-causes 
real wages, is also tested in the same manner. The results are reported in Table 2.  
Table 2 reports the existence of unidirectional causality from real wages to labor 
productivity, and the causality is stronger for manufacturing than other industries overall. 
The empirical verification that real wages precede labor productivity, a more precise 
interpretation of Granger-causality, implies that real wage increases entice capitalists, 
under competitive pressure from other capitalists, into implementing technological 
                                          
5 This methodology is challengeable as it not only requires unit root and cointegrating rank pretests 
but also might be biased toward rejecting the non-causality null since cointegration implies 
existence of long-run causality for at least one direction. Therefore, Toda and Yamamoto’s (1995) 
methodology which estimates augmented VAR with level variables may be a better strategy which 
reduces the risks of wrongly identifying the order of integration. However, as Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995:246) explicitly explains, when the VAR’s lag length is just one as in our paper, the 
inefficiency caused by adding even one extra lag might be relatively large. 
 
 
progress to  secure their own profitability. The magnitude of such “wage-cost induced” 
labor productivity growth seems to be substantial given that Vergeer & Kleinknecht (2011) 
reported 0.31-0.39 percentage points for a panel data of OECD countries (1960-2004) and  
Naastepad (2006) attributed 90% of the Dutch productivity growth slowdown after 1982 to 
the decline in real wage growth.  
Table 2. Granger-causality test between the real wage rate and labor productivity 
Direction of causality 
lag 1  1ag 2 
Joint F-statistic 
All-Industry 
RW ⇏	LP 4.757** 4.359** 
LRW ⇏	LLP 2.290* 2.601* 
LP	⇏	RW 1.173 1.011 
LLP	⇏	LRW 2.701* 2.188 
Manufacturing 
RW ⇏	LP 16.773*** 11.933*** 
LRW ⇏	LLP 3.415** 4.280** 
LP	⇏	RW 0.267 0.873 
LLP	⇏	LRW 1.093 2.723* 
Note: ⇏	means the null hypothesis of non-causality.  
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Meanwhile, the causal direction from real wages to labor productivity runs counter to the 
Neoclassical marginal productivity theory, which states that wages are determined with 
respect to productivity. Except for variants of the efficiency wage theory, the neoclassical 
proposition that higher productivity will cause higher real wages lacks empirical support, 
at least for Korea.6 
 
5. Explaining Capital Productivity Change 
It is worth noting why we should proceed to the separate discussion of capital 
                                          
6 Although not based on the same framework as ours, previous research for other countries such as 
Australia (Kumar et al. 2012) and Turkey (Bildirici & Alp 2008) also confirm the causal direction 
from real wages to labor productivity. 
 
 
productivity changes. The direction of causality from real wages to labor productivity 
cannot be ascribed only to the MBTC. The causality can also be explained in the context of 
the Kaldor-Verdoorn effect, which suggests that aggregate demand spurred by wage share 
increases, more obviously in a wage-led economy, affects the learning-by-doing and 
division of labor leading to higher labor productivity. Similarly, the Neoclassical efficiency 
wage theory also suggests that higher wages attract more productive workers who 
rationally avoid being dismissed. That is, the econometric finding of causation from real 
wages to labor productivity is simply a confirmation of MBTC’s necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition.7 For this reason, the factors that underpin MBTC in terms of capital 
productivity change merit a detailed examination; hence, we first investigated the 
relationship between real wages and capital productivity. 
Fig. 5. Capital productivity and (log) real wage rate, 1970-2013. 
(a) All-industry                    (b) Manufacturing 
    
Figure 5, the scatter plot with regression line between the two variables, shows it is 
evident that capital productivity growth depends negatively on real wage growth.8 This 
                                          
7 The Kaleckian models, such as You (1994) and Cassetti (2003) described, successfully highlight the 
endogenous demand-side conditions of facilitating technological innovations, but the innovations’ 
capital-using aspect is not addressed. Likewise, although Hein & Tarassow (2010) and Storm & 
Naastepad (2013) attempted to differentiate the mixed effects of technical change attributed to both 
the Kaleckian demand effect and the Marxian effect, their empirical estimations are limited to the 
change in labor productivity only. 
8  We refrain from repeating the econometric inferences for capital productivity. The capital 
productivity series for all-industry does not have a unit root (see Appendix), as in both series of 
labor productivity and real wages, and the ECM specifications are not applicable due to the lack of 
evidence of cointegration. Hence, a more robust econometric specification against spurious 
regressions should employ a lengthy model, e.g., the autoregressive distributed lag model with 
other control variables; however, we only present several graphs for the sake of brevity and 
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result implies that capital-using technological progress has been adopted more frequently 
against the increase of workers’ power, which again confirms the predominance of MBTC 
in the long run. 
However, as mentioned, the post-crisis period saw an impressive and positive capital 
productivity growth, particularly in manufacturing. Capital productivity increase per se can 
be interpreted as an enhanced efficiency of capital in terms of an output increase realized 
on the basis of a given stock of capital. If such dynamism was caused, as generally 
conceived, by virtue of the adoption of new innovative technologies, the hypothesis of 
MBTC’s dominance is debatable, if not untenable. Michl (1992) stresses that endogenous 
capital-saving technical change may emerge as the effect of learning-by-doing driven by 
cumulative output while the exogenous natural direction of technology is capital-using, 
and the opposite combination of exogenous capital-saving and endougenous capital-using 
technical change is also plausible. In other words, which aspect of capital productivity 
change will prevail depends not on a priori theorems but on empirical grounds. Hence, we 
explored several figures and statistics of potential factors that may have enhanced capital 
productivity, each of which would entail contrasting tenets from Neoclassical, Keynesian 
or Marxian economics. 
First, from the viewpoint of Neoclasscial endogenous growth theory, R&D investment is 
critical for enhancing capital efficiency. The diffusion of innovative technologies can help 
an economy build new types of dynamic efficiency. Aside from methodological flaws like 
“setting up capital-like sectors for the production of human capital and R&D, bundling up 
and representing technical change through the device of treating it like a new factor of 
production” (Fine & Dimakou 2016:58), it is undeniable that technological advances 
related with so-called knowledge creation might have operated to some extent. However, 
examining the figures compiled in the OECD Structural Analysis database (2016), R&D 
intensity of high and medium-high technology manufacturers, which is calculated as R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of value added, rose from 10.1% in 1995 to 13.7% in 2009. 
Similar increments are neither uncommon among OECD economies nor comparable to 
those of advanced economies such as the U.S. (from 16.5% to 21.8%), the U.K. (from 11.0% 
to 15.2%) and Japan (from 14.2% to 22.7%), who are said to be in a Solovian steady state. 
Besides, the national balance sheet accounts (Bank of Korea 2015) show that, while the 
share of intellectual property products in total fixed assets of all corporations rose from 1.8% 
in 1970 to 9.9% in 2013, the share’s annual growth rate has dropped from 4.8% in the pre-
crisis to 2.6% in the post-crisis period. In sum, the Neoclassical orthodoxy which 
                                                                                                                         
intuitive obviousness. 
 
 
accentuates technology diffusion, knowledge accumulation, and the like, does not 
persuasively explain why capital productivity appreciates during economic downturns. 
Second, we traced the cyclical demand-side factor’s effect on capital productivity because 
Figure 5 may have disclosed only the long-run trend aspect of capital productivity. It is 
motivated by the Kaleckian reasoning, which states that capital investment is a function of 
the changes in the expected profit rate and capacity utilization (Bhaduri & Marglin 1990; 
Hein 2008). The increase of capacity utilization (hereafter “CU”), which commonly serves 
as a proxy for cyclical demand,9 stimulates further investment, and the effect may well be 
reflected in capital productivity.  
Fig. 6. Capacity utilization and cyclical component of capital productivity; manufacturing 
Note: Capacity utilization rate’s benchmark year is 2010. 
Source: Bank of Korea, Author’s calculation. 
Hence, we plot the CU rate and the cyclical element of the HP-filtered (λ=100) capital 
productivity in Figure 6. Although a robust relationship between the level variables in 
different time periods has not been found, the cyclical series of capital productivity shows 
a very similar evolution to the CU rate, which means capital productivity moves 
procyclically.10 In other words, the role of demand-side shocks in technical change is 
sufficiently relevant, aside from the traditional concern of the short-run versus the long-run 
breadth of analysis. Consequently, temporary aggregate demand rebounds including a 
                                          
9 The choice of the demand-side variable is an open issue, but we chose the CU rate as the best proxy. 
The comparison with other conventional options, such as the GDP’s cycle component or output gap, 
runs the risk of tautology because the capital productivity variable already has the output term in 
the numerator. Moreover, output gap estimates based on potential output are neither theoretically 
flawless nor officially reported in Korea. 
10 Schoder (2012) provides theoretical arguments as to capital productivity procyclicality for the 
reason that firms seek to adjust capital productivity to narrow the gap between realized and desired 
CU. 
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short boom in the mid-2000s, contributed to the rise of capital productivity, if not a 
complete reversal of the long-run trend. 
Last, but most importantly, turning to a Marxian perspective, exploitation and class 
conflict dynamics are another key to puzzle out capital productivity appreciation. As 
inferred from the simple identity Y/K= (L/K) × (Y/L), the movement of capital 
productivity is the combination of capital intensity and labor productivity. 
Regarding the first term (L/K) of the identity, it is bound to decrease with higher capital 
deepening which substitutes capital for labor. But, the annual capital deepening growth rate 
has almost halved from 9.33% (1987-1997) to 5.11% (1998-2013) for all industries and 
from 11.83% to 6.70% for manufacturing. The primary culprit that put a damper on capital 
deepening is the rising price of capital goods. As Figure 7 shows, although the cheap and 
stable price of capital goods, partly credited to the previous developmental state’s resource 
allocation, fueled massive capital-intensive investment, the relative price to the price of 
output since the Asian crisis has steeply risen. 
Fig. 7. Relative price of capital goods to the GDP deflator, manufacturing 
 
Source: Bank of Korea, author’s calculation. 
The capital goods price hike clearly facilitates investment with capital-saving rather than 
capital-using technologies. But more expensive capital goods do not fully explain the 
decline in capital deepening. As implied by the data shown in Figure 4, profit income share 
soared beginning with the crisis. The ratio of corporate saving to disposable income also 
increased drastically from 2.9% (1997) to 11.0% (2010). The corporate saving glut 
stemmed from surging operating surplus as well as benefits from radical tax breaks by the 
neoliberal state, and reduction of financial costs in a long, low-interest environment, etc. 
That is, it’s unclear whether capitalists could ill afford to increase capital-intensive 
investment only owing to cost burden of capital goods. Rather, the slowdown in capital 
deepening also reflects worker’s non-threatening bargaining power and moderated wage 
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increase which contributed to the reduction of firms’ incentives for capital-using 
technologies.11 
As for the second term (Y/L) of the identity, the issues are more delicate. Labor 
productivity growth sizably contributed to sustaining and raising capital productivity for 
this period. Interestingly, for the period 1998 to 2013, though not appreciable as a pre-
crisis period, average labor productivity growth per annum in manufacturing was over 
7.4%. The record is noteworthy because it was achieved without vigorous capital 
deepening as explained above.  
Given that the labor productivity series described in this paper was constructed as output 
per total hours worked, the labor productivity increase was primarily due to the working 
hours reduction demanded by Korean workers’ strenuous struggle and international 
pressure, which crucially resulted in the 40-hour workweek system adoption in 2004. 
Figure 8 shows there has been a gradual decline in average hours worked per worker since 
the mid-1980s, although Korea is still not free from the infamy of recording the first or 
second longest working hours among OECD economies. 
Fig. 8. Annual working hours; manufacturing.  
  
Source: laborstat.molab.go.kr (Ministry of Employment and Labor). 
On the other hand, the relatively high labor productivity growth reflects intensified 
worker exploitation. It became easier for firms to extract labor productivity increases by 
further expanding the use of temporary workers and low-wage subcontractors. Labor 
market flexibility reforms for over a decade have not only greatly reduced workers’ ability 
                                          
11 Other reasons for the remarkable discrepancy between corporate saving and investment can be 
deduced from various factors; for example financialization (Stockhammer 2004) and monopoly 
(Foster and McChesney 2012). To verify these hypotheses in detail is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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to negotiate higher wages and obtain employment stability but also frustrated worker 
solidarity. As a result, Korea has the highest incidence of low-paid work among full-time 
workers and the third-highest level of earnings dispersion, just below the U.S. and Israel as 
of 2011 (OECD 2013: figure 3.4). Moreover, temporary employment accounts for 22.4% 
of total dependent employment in Korea—the fourth largest among OECD members. Such 
workers are least likely to move into permanent employment among their counterparts in 
15 other OECD members, which is true over both one-year (11.1%) and three-year (22.4%) 
horizon (OECD 2013: table 3.7).  
It is doubtful whether such cost-cutting strategies as nonregular employment and external 
labor flexibility are sustainable for long-run economic growth (Lucidi & Kleinknecht 
2010).12 But these organizational changes deserve to be called “effort-biased technical 
change” using Green’s (2007) terminology, as they demand more highly-committed and 
more productive “human capital” by using temporary workers and contractors in the 
absence of substantial capital deepening. After all, it was the highly strengthened power of 
capitalists vis-à-vis workers under the prolonged stagnation that enabled the contradictory 
capital productivity appreciation. In theory, the bias of technical change does not 
presuppose a high or low growth rate of capital intensity. However, as in our case, the U.S. 
(1982-1997), Argentina (1982-1994) and Chile (1964-1989) together show that Hicks-
neutral technical change, where both labor productivity and capital productivity rise,  
occurred when capital deepening was lethargic (Mohun 2009; Mendoza 2007). And they 
have in common that those eras are marked by the relative weakening or defeat of the 
working class. It suggests that although the physical outcome of technical change may be 
neutral in the strict sense of the word, the driver of direction in technical change is far from 
being “neutral” as the class conflicts center on the adoption of specific technologies. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper empirically examined the bias of technical change and investigated its 
determinants in Korea. The endogenous direction of technical change has been a rather- 
neglected topic in Neoclassical growth literature, which is especially true for Korea who 
achieved extremely rapid growth. Instead, we used the growth-distribution schedule to 
show that the labor-saving and capital-using pattern have been the dominant type of 
technical progress. The relationship between technical change and real wage growth via 
                                          
12 Recently, even IMF researchers (Aoyagi & Ganelli 2013) propose reducing the labor market 
duality and increasing wages to move toward higher growth. 
 
 
the evolution of labor and capital productivity verified the historical direction of technical 
change against the rise and fall of the working class, which is the rationale behind the 
MBTC. Furthermore, the direction in technical change during the post crisis period 
suggests that sluggish wage growth with undermined workers’ power ironically contributes 
to attenuating the incentives for technological progress. Likewise, the contemporary 
deviation of capital productivity from the long-run trend of MBTC is not attributable to the 
vitality of new technological innovations, but rather is the reflection of class dynamics over 
extracting productivity under weaker capital deepening. 
Our study’s policy implications are straightforward. The alternative growth strategy 
against the contemporary secular recession should embrace policies that favor increases in 
real wages and wage shares. Taking MBTC into consideration, the recent deterioration of 
labor unions and their bargaining power prolongs the recession by deterring technical 
progress as well as by only stifling effective demand. In this regard, our findings suggest 
that higher wage-induced technical innovation under stable employment conditions will 
offer the tipping point for economic recovery with decent work. 
However, two points are worth mentioning regarding growth dynamics. First, the 
dominance of the endogenous MBTC pattern may forecast a gloomy picture for workers 
because higher real wage growth may generate a lower employment by accelerating the 
worker-replacing technology. MBTC’s job-loss potential can primarily reduce the wage-
fueled growth effects that are strongly underlined by the recent Post-Keynesian literature. 
Although the question of whether such trade-offs will be substantively significant in Korea 
and other specific economies should be explored in future research, the effect of wage 
increase on aggregate demand may be overestimated if we pay scant attention to the 
aspects of technical change that appear in employment.13 Second, as long as the trend of 
MBTC with a constant or rising labor share logically incurs the tendency for the rate of 
profit to fall, an intense class struggle from a capitalist counter-attack is inevitable, for 
which the Korean economy has been no exception as we have shown. In other words, the 
dominance of MBTC allows little room for class compromise or cooperative capitalist 
growth that is suggested by naive Keynesian wishes. These will be knotty points for the 
pro-labor economics camps to settle, when designing alternative growth policies.  
 
                                          
13 Storm and Naastepad (2013:109) correctly notes, “the higher is the sensitivity of productivity 
growth to real wage growth, the more limited will be the strength of the wage-led nature of 
aggregate demand.” 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Unit Root Tests  
Variables  LP LLP RW LRW CP 
All-Industry ADF  Levels -1.152 -2.131 -2.395 -2.378 -6.895*** 
First Difference -9.427*** -6.725*** -2.568* -3.953*** -4.241*** 
PP   Levels  -1.804 -2.146 -2.372 -2.433 -5.409*** 
First Difference -8.705*** -6.729*** -4.447*** -3.765*** -4.343*** 
Manufacturing ADF  Levels 2.368 -2.429 -2.660 -2.370 -2.263 
First Difference -7.437*** -6.961*** -2.706* -3.971*** -4.498*** 
PP   Levels -0.061 -2.429 -2.055 -2.089 -2.139 
First Difference -6.637*** -6.966*** -3.459* -3.912** -4.622*** 
Note: L stands for logarithm; RW real wage rate; LP labor productivity; CP capital productivity;  
ADF Augmented Dickey-Fuller test; PP Phillips–Perron test.  
* significance at 10 percent; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
 
Table A2. Johansen bivariate cointegration 
Hypothesized number of cointegrating equations λ-trace Statistic λ-Max Statistic 
All-Industry 
LP-RW None 22.018** 19.898** At most 1 2.120 2.120 
LLP-LRW None 13.675* 12.526* At most 1 1.149 1.149 
Manufacturing 
LP-RW None 23.611** 22.063** At most 1 1.547 1.547 
LLP-LRW None 17.431** 15.766** At most 1 1.665 1.665 
 
